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Summary:
This study conducts a test of the semi-strong efficient market
hypothesis (EMH) by examining the price and volume changes surround-
ing the day a split is announced and analyzes the potential for
abnormal trading profits from acquiring stock immediately before the
public announcement or immediately after the announcement. The
results indicate a definite impact on price and volume but consistently
confirm the semi-strong EMH based upon price movements and profit
opportunities under almost all possible conditions.

SHORT-RUN PROFITS FROM STOCK SPLITS
Abstract
This study conducts a test of the semi-strong efficient market hy-
pothesis (EMH) by examining the price and volume changes surrounding the
day a split is announced and analyzes the potential for abnormal trading
profits from acquiring stock immediately before the public announcement
or immediately after the announcement . The results indicate a definite
impact on price and volume but consistently confirm the semi-strong EMH
based upon price movements and profit opportunities under almost all pos-
sible conditions.
July, 1979
SHORT-RUN PROFITS FROM STOCK SPLITS*
Frank K. Reilly
Eugene F. Drzycimski**
INTRODUCTION
For almost half a century stock splits have been analyzed for their
value to the issuing firms, to the stockholders of those firms, and to
potential stockholders. Despite a number of assumed advantages, the
prior studies have generally indicated no long-run benefit to the cor-
poration from a stock-split except that in some cases there has been an
increase in the number of stockholders. Even so, many observers still
contend that investors can make abnormal profits by investing in stocks
that are going to split although the academic studies have indicated
that stock prices apparently have discounted all the favorable news
prior to the split. Notably, most prior studies that examined the
effect of a stock split on stock prices employed monthly data and ex-
amined stock price movements relative to the split date rather than
the more relevant announcement date. The purpose of this study is to
conduct a test of the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis by ex-
amining the price and volume changes surrounding the day a split is
announced and analyze the potential for abnormal trading profits from
acquiring the stock of companies immediately before the announcement of
*
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a stock split or immediately after the announcement. Therefore, in con-
trast to prior studies that examined monthly stock price data, this study
examines daily stock prices, it also considers trading volume data which
has not been examined in prior work and concentrates on the period sur-
rounding the announcement of the stock split contained in the Wall Street
Journal rather than the split date.
The initial section contains a discussion of prior studies that ana-
lyzed the effect on returns of stock splits. In section two we consider
the study sample, the period of analysis, and analyze absolute and rela-
tive price and trading volume for the period surrounding the announcement.
Section three contains a description of alternative trading rules and
presents the results of implementing the rules. The final section con-
tains a summary and conclusion followed by a discussion of the implica-
tions of the results for the efficient market hypothesis.
PRIOR RESEARCH ON PRICE EFFECTS OF STOCK SPLITS
Early Studies
Ninety-five stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange which split
during the period 1921 to 1931 were examined for profit potential by
Dolley. Sixty percent of the stocks involved enjoyed a rapid price
increase while 27 percent suffered a price decline following the split.
All price activity was reported without adjustment for market movement.
Fifteen years later Myers and Bakay used the Standard and Poor's
Index to remove market movement from the price changes of 70 split stocks
2during the period eight weeks before to eight weeks after the split date.
J. C. Dolley, "Characteristics and Procedures of Common Stock Split-
Up s," Harvard_JujinejsJReview, Vol. 11, No. 3 (April, 1933), pp. 316-326.
2
J. H. Myers and A. J. Eakay, "Influence of Stock Split-Ups on Market
Price," Harvard Business Review
, Vol. 26, No. 2 (March, 1948), pp. 251-255,
The results indicated excess returns cf almost 2C percent during the 16
vee>. per ice surrcurding the split dare.
Ccucenrratiug :r. the relative—to-market price activity prior to the
announcement in the financial press of 39 stock splits in 1947 3urrell
investigated a ncdified version of the strong form of the efficient market
hyp c theses." He ftur.c an average relative increase cf five percent during
the 30 days before the announcement date. Above average profits were
possible if investments sere nade based on inside formation or in anti-
cipation cf a forthcoming stock split.
:ci s.c _
A series of studies by Barker questioned the expected higher prices
accruing to stockholders owning shares that split or paid stock dividends
supposedly because of broader markets and increases in demand. 3arker
4
examined 90 firms on the NYSE that split their stock during 1951-1953.
Prices were acquired for three dates: split date minus one year, the
split date, and split date plus six months. These prices were converted
to price relatives by applying the appropriate Standard and Poor's in-
dustry subgroup index.
The influence of cash dividends was studied by dividing the total
sample into a group of 35 stocks which enjoyed dividend increases and
55 stocks which received no dividend increases. The average price rela-
tive of the group receiving dividend increases was 15 percent higher at
3
0. K. Burr ell, "Price Effects of Stock Dividends and Split-Ups,"
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle
,
(December 2, 1948), p. 10.
4
C. Austin Barker, "Effective Stock Splits," Harvard 3usiness Review
,
Vol. 34, No. 1 (January-February, 1956), pp. 101-106.
the split date and six tenths following the split. The average price
relative for the group without dividend increases was six percent higher
en the split date but declined during the six souths after the split
date to its relative level of one year prior to the split."
Barker observed that the dividend increase group experienced "a
short but sharp run-up for one to three days in a strong bull market at
the date of announcement cr other published news of the split-up."
Subsequently Barker examined the performance of 190 firms which
paid stock dividends accompanied by total cash dividend increases during
the period 1951-1954. Ee observed "that there is often a strong but
short-lived price run-up during the first few days after news of a stock
dividend reaches the public..." Unfortunately, both splits and stock
dividends were analyzed using only a few spot price relatives centered
on split dates and ex-dividend dates.
In a follow-up article Barker studied the effect of splits during
8
the strong bull market period of 19^4-1955. Eighty-eight zirms which
had splits of between 2-to-l and 3-to-l were divided into 75 stocks en-
joying total cash dividend increases and 13 stocks not accompanied by
dividend increases. Again the results indicated substantial relative
gains for the split stocks that had dividend increases at the split date
and six months after. In contrast, those stocks that did not have a
3
Ibid
., pp. 102, 103,
6
lb id., p. 103.
C. Austin Barker, "Evaluation of Stock Dividends," Harvard Business
Review
,
Vol. 36, >to . 4 (July-August, 1958), pp. 99-113.
a
C. Austin 3arker, "Stock Splits in a Bull Market," Harvard Business
Review
,
Vol. 35, No. 3 (May-June, 1957), pp. 72-79.
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dividend increase were higher at the split date, but their relative prices
declined during the subsequent six months to a point below the prior year
price. Barker concluded that it was the cash dividend paying ability
and not the mechanical act of splitting which favorably affected stock
prices. Similarly he again observed "the many instances in which a very
sharp increase occurred when news of the projected split first reached
9
the public." While Barker s long-run conclusions are reasonable, his
data precludes an investigation of both the timing and the duration of
stock price activity surrounding the announcement date.
Kimball and Pap era
Kimball and Papera investigated short-term price activity surround-
ing a stock split by an analysis of 28 NYSE stocks that split during the
first half of 1961. They considered prices on the announcement date,
the record date and- the split date. They concluded that the stock split
itself favorably influenced market prices both for a 30 day period prior
to the announcement date and for 14 days after the announcement, record,
and split dates. The impact of the conclusions are reduced because of
the limited sample, a limited number of observations, but mainly because
almost none of the prices are adjusted for aggregate market activity.
9
Ibid.
, p. 75,
Peter Kimball and D. Robert Papera, "Effect of Stock Splits on Short-
Term Market Prices," Financial Analysts Journal
,
Vol. 20, No. 3 (May-
June, 1964), pp. 75-80.
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Johnson
A much more rigorous and expansive test of the effect of splits on
price was conducted by Johnson. Johnson developed a least-squares
multiple regression which attempted to explain relative price changes
based on measures of dividends, earnings, split or non-split status,
and the relevant industry stock price index. The test sample consisted
of 73 New York Stock Exchange shares which split at least 2 for 1 during
1957. A similar number of non-split stocks which also had increased
their cash dividends were randomly chosen.
Because there was "evidence of some extraordinary price activity
prior to the split date, especially around the time of the announcement
i 2by a board, the study began and ended with stock prices seven and
one-half months prior to the split date and four and one-half months
after the split date.
Employing various combinations of the above variables the largest
—2
coefficient of determination derived was 0.54 (R ). The industry index
variable was found to possess no explanatory power and the dividend coef-
ficients were negative and not statistically significant. However, a
significant relative price change was associated with stock splits.
Based on these results the author concluded that investors owning stocks
seven and one-half months prior to a split in 1959 and holding those
shares until four and one-half months after the split would have earned
Keith B. Johnson, "Stock Splits and Price Change," Journal of Finance
,
Vol. 21, No. 5 (December, 1966), pp. 675-686.
12
Ibid., p. 679.
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higher relative returns than those generated from a similar investment
13in non-split stocks regardless of dividends.
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll
By far the most exhaustive study of the impact of stock splits, as
far as the size of the data base is concerned, is the classic study by
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (FFJR) . All stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange between January, 1927 and December, 1959 which had
stock distributions of 25 percent or more and were listed for a period
of 24 months surrounding the split date were included. The sample con-
sisted of 622 securities for a total of 940 splits.
Recall that prior studies adjusted for market movements by subtracting
the price change for an aggregate market series or an industry series.
In contrast, FFJR contended that each stock had a unique relationship to
the market (as implied by the capital .asset pricing model) and derived
this unique relationship by examining the linear regression model for
each stock with the Fisher Link Relative Index of all stocks on the NYSE.
Because the preliminary analysis indicated that the residuals were non-
zero for the period surrounding the splits, the regression models ex-
cluded the observations 15 months before and after the split. Given
this regression model which provided a unique market adjustment for each
stock, the analysis centered on the analysis of the residuals from this
13
Ibid.
,
p. 15.
14
Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen and Richard Roll,
"The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information," International Economic
Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February, 1969), pp. 1-22.
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model for the 60 months surrounding the split in order to trace the
possible existence of any abnormal returns related to stock splits.
Split securities were grouped according to whether cash dividends either
increased or decreased relative to the average dividends paid by all
securities on the NYSE. Results show that the average residuals prior
to the month of the actual split were uniformly positive for both divi-
dend groups with the highest average residuals (and the highest average
monthly rates of return) occurring in the four months immediately pre-
ceding the split month after which the residuals for the total sample
were randomly distributed around zero. Notably, since the anouncement
date varies between one and four months before the actual split date,
opportunities for abnormal profits might remain once the public is in-
formed of the impending split.
An analysis of the splits grouped according to relative dividend
action indicated that the residuals for the dividend decrease stocks did
not rise as high during the pre-split period and subsequently fell during
the post-split period whereas the dividend increase stocks continued a
1 fi
modest gain for approximately 15 months into the post-split period.
The authors concluded that for the dividend decrease group the cumulative
average residuals "plummet in the few months following the split when
the anticipated dividend increase is not forthcoming ... when a year has
passed after the split, the cumulative average residual has fallen to
about where it was five months prior to the split ... the apparent effects
15
Ibid
. , p. 13.
] 6
Ibid., p. 15.
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of the split seem to have been completely wiped away, and the stock's
returns have reverted to their normal relationship with market returns."
Finally, an attempt was made to determine the speed with which the
market reacts to split information. Average and cumulative average resi-
duals were computed for a random sample of 52 splits using the announce-
ment month as month zero rather than the split month as previously de-
fined. While admitting that their "data do not allow full examination
of this question," ... they concluded that "the behavior of the residuals
after the announcement date is almost identical to the behavior of the
1 Q
residuals after the split date. The large positive residuals (found
previously) in the three or four months before the split month are ex-
plained away in that "the behavior of the average residuals was not re-
in
presentative of the behavior of the residuals for individual securities.
It is contended that these large positive residuals "merely reflect the
fact that, from split to split, there is a variable lag between the time
the split information reaches the market and the time when the split
20becomes effective." The current authors find these latter results
somewhat puzzling because they appear to conflict with the major results.
Specifically, moving the center vertical axis of zero to the left up to
four months, from the split month to the announcement month, places the
average large positive residuals and the high and rising cumulative
17
Ibid.
,
p. 17.
Ibid
. p
.
18 .
19
Ibid
., p. 19.
20T,,. OAIbid. p. 20.
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average residuals to the right and, therefore, subsequent to the time
the split information becomes publicly known. An acceptance of the
sample's conclusions along with the attendant rationalization would
serve to cast serious doubt upon the results of the primary investigation.
At any rate, end-of-month prices were not sufficiently specific for use
in short-term trading activity.
Hausman, West and Largay
A discriminating study by Hausman, West and Largay (HWL) attempted
to synthesize the results from Johnson and FFJR and also to partially
21
replicate Johnson's results. Since the Johnson procedure analyzed
the total 12 months from seven and one-half months prior to the split
date to four and one-half months after the split date HWL questioned
whether the significant positive split variable may have been due to
the expected price increases prior to the split. FFJR's tentative con-
clusions about the behavior of prices subsequent to the announcement
month provided an additional incentive for study.
In addition to the beginning and ending values used and supplied
to the authors by Johnson they also examined prices on the split date,
the announcement date in the Wall Street Journal , and a point four
weeks prior to the announcement date. The return variable did not
include cash dividends received during the period and thus may have
understated the returns especially for split stocks which received
increased cash dividends. In essence, the HWL model was the same as
21
W. H. Hausman, R. R. West, and J. A. Largay, "Stock Splits, Price
Changes, and Trading Profits: A Synthesis," Journal of Finance
,
Vol.
14, No. 1 (January, 1971), pp. 69-77.
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the Johnson model except that they did not include a dividend variable
22because it had been negative and insignificant in the Johnson study.
Regressions were run covering all possible time periods from combin-
ations of the five observations. While the coefficient of determination
2
(R ) did not attain a value greater than 0.51, the coefficients had the
expected signs and were reasonably significant. The coefficient for the
split variable was significant for all runs which included the four -week
period prior to the announcement date and the split coefficient reached
its largest value during that specific period. The split coefficient was
not significant for intervals that included only periods following the
23
announcement date.
HVL concluded "that buying stocks on (or after) the date on which
a split has been publicly announced does not lead to systematic price
appreciation greater than the appreciation that might be expected from
underlying factors such as corporate earnings and the industry-by-industry
2L
outlook." Because of the limited observation points it is not possible
to derive conclusions regarding short-term trading opportunities. It is
felt that more observations on both sides of the crucial announcement
date are necessary.
Millar and Fielitz
Millar and Fielitz were concerned with whether stock dividends and
splits contained information about future price performance and whether
22
Ibid
., p. 74.
23
Ibid
. , p . 75.
24
bid.
, p . 76.
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resultant prices were a function of the market period, the size of the
25distribution, and the terminology used to describe the distribution.
Three years representing alternative market phases were selected
from the period July 1963 to December 1968 in an effort to identify the
effect of underlying market trends. Using the Dow Jones Industrial
Average 1964 was designated a bull market, 1966 a bear market, and mid-
1967 to mid-1968 a stable or no-change market. Distributions of 20
percent or greater that were termed splits or stock dividends from either
the NYSE or the ASE were identified and placed; 39 in the bull market,
41 in the bear market, and 42 in the stable market. Of these 7 9 were
stock splits and 43 were stock dividend distributions. Monthly data
for price, dividends, earnings, industry stock price index, and general
market stock price index for 12 months surrounding the distribution
data were collected. They collected similar data for a control group
of 122 stocks that were not splitting or issuing stock dividends during
the same time interval. The estimated residual price effect from a
multiple regression model was computed and analyzed. Similar to FFJR
the residuals were averaged and cumulated around the split or new-
distribution month. The patterns of the residuals of the new-distri-
bution stocks and the control stocks were significantly different.
For the distribution group the pre-distribution months generated no
negative residuals, while the greatest positive average residuals occurred
two or three months before the distribution month and during the distri-
bution month itself. The cumulative average residuals increased each
25
James A. Millar and Bruce D. Fielitz, "Stock-Split and Stock-Dividend
Decisions," Financial Management
,
Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter, 1973), pp. 35-45.
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month during the pre-distribution period and reached their highest value
°6
one month following the distribution month.
These results are similar to the FFJR primary results because they
concentrated on the split month. As a result, short-term trading profits
might be possible due to large, positive residuals around the announce-
ment date and continuing through the split date or distribution month.
Further examination showed no significant difference in the residuals
when the sample was grouped by market phase or type or size of distri-
bution.
Anna Merjos
Anna Merjos examined 60 OTC stocks which split at least 2-for-l from
July 1975 through April, 1976 by analyzing prices at three points in time:
two months before the announcement date, the announcement date, and two
months following the announcement. Percentage changes were computed be-
27
tween these three dates adjusted for the DJIA.
Eighty-two percent of the stocks experienced an absolute price in-
crease during the two month pre-announcement period. Half the group
experienced absolute price increases over the two month post-announcement
period. Sixty percent of the stocks had a relative-to-market gain during
the pre-announcement period. Fifty-five percent of the stocks enjoyed
relative-to-market average price increases during the two month post-
announcement period.
Ibid
. , pp. 40, 41.
27
Anna Merjos, "Sell On the News - When Stocks Split Take the Money
and Run," Barrons (May 31, 1976), pp. 11, 16, 17.
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Ear-Yosef and Brown
A study by Ear-Yosef and Erovn raised questions concerning the
2£
constant beta procedure employed by FFJE.. Specifically, the assumption
made by FFJF. that the systematic risk of split securities remained con-
stant during the period surrounding the split date was questioned. They
argued that it is likely that information about charges in cash dividends
was uncertain prior to the announcement date thereby causing abnormally
large variability in returns (increased systematic risk) during the
period around the split date. Determining whether this variability re-
sults in increased systematic risk was the irajor thrust of the study.
They examined 108 monthly stock prices for 219 securities which
sp'it ''distributions of 25 percent or more) between 1945 and 1964.
Moving betas for each security were averaged for each cf the ICC months.
Abnormal returns (residuals) for each security were estimated for each
month. The total sample was also divided into a group of 156 securities
which increased total cash dividends after the split and 63 stocks which
did not increase their cash dividends. Similar to FFJF, the residuals
were centered around the split month.
The analysis demonstrated that for the entire sample the moving
average betas (17= 3 C ) increased, peahed approximately one year prior to
the split month and then returned to beginning levels by the split month
2°
plus three years. '" The beginning and ending betas were similar to the
nedian, non-moving beta computed by FFJF.
Sasson Bar-Yosef and Lawrence D. Frown, "A reexamination of Stock
Splits Using Moving Eetas," Journal of Finance , Vol. 32, No. 4 (September,
1977), pp. 1C69-1C80.
-Ibid., p. 1072.
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This study also pointed out that firms which split following higher
earnings reduced uncertainty regarding future cash dividends since the
plot of moving betas fell farther and at a steeper rate for those firms
which increased total cash dividends after the split. In contrast, the
moving average betas for firms which split but did not increase total
cash dividends continued to rise until approximately 20 months after the
30
split month. Often because these firms had not generated rising
earnings investors found the split difficult to interpret and uncertainty
was increased. This belief was tested by generating residuals by both
the FFJR constant beta method and the moving average beta technique.
The cumulative average residuals increased more under the constant beta
method than under the moving beta calculation. Investors in firms which
split and increased cash dividends therefore gained less than posited
under the constant beta procedure. Firms which split and failed to in-
crease total cash dividends actually generated average cumulative resi-
duals below the value reached around the announcement date when calcu-
lated by the moving beta method. It was concluded that FFJR overstated
returns to investors since their method understated the attendant risks
31posed by stock splits.
Summary of Prior Studies
Because of the widespread interest in stock splits and the folk-
lore involved numerous studies have examined the pattern of returns
for the period surrounding the split. The strong consensus using
3G
Ibid.
,
p. 1073.
31
Ibid.
,
pp. 1075-1080.
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monthly data is that almost all the positive abnormal price movements
occur prior to the split or during the month of the split which implies
that there are few if any long term benefits to the firm. The results
as applied to the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis likewise in-
dicate that most of the abnormal price movement occurs prior to the split
and even prior to the announcement. Unfortunately, these results are
dampened by the use of monthly data or data for specific days prior to
the announcement (e.g., four weeks; seven months) and individual days
after the announcement. Assuming that one is attempting to determine
the pattern of price adjustment to a split announcement, it would appear
preferable to examine a number of consecutive days surrounding the
announcement . Also, in order to examine the information impact of the
announcement, it would be important to examine the volume of trading
for the period surrounding the announcement and none of the prior studies
examined volume. The current study considers these factors by examining
price and volume for a number of consecutive days surrounding the announce-
ment of the stock splits.
SAMPLE AND OVERALL ANALYSIS
The Sampl
e
The sample includes a number of common stocks listed on the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), that split two-for-one during the 13 year
period 1964-1976. For each year ten stocks were randomly selected from
those that split two-for-one. Therefore, the split sample includes 130
stocks. For each split, a control common stock was likewise randomly
selected from those stocks listed on the NYSE at the time of the split
-17-
announcement. AIsc, there was a comparison tc the Standard & Poor's
Composite Index cf 500 stocks.
Sample Period
The total sample period encompassed 36 trading days including the
15 trading days before the announcement in the Wall Street Journal , the
day of the announcement, and the 2C trading days following the announce-
ment. For each of the 26 days the analysis considers the closing price
and the volume of trading for the split stock, the random stock, and the
aggregate NYSE as represented by the S&F 500 Index.
Analysis of Price Changes
The price changes surrounding the announcement are analyzed in abso-
lute terms, relative tc a random stock, and relative to the irarket index.
Specifically, we computed the average cross-secticnal price for all the
split stocks and the random stocks for each day during the 36 day period
surrounding the split announcement as follows:
130
KAP = I ?. /H
t i=1 i.t
IIAT = mean average closing price of the split stock cr the
randomly selected stock on day t.
P. = closing price of split stock or random stock i, on
,Z day t.
N = 130 split stocks or rancor stocks.
The result is a time series of average closing prices for the split
stocks or the random, stocks for cays running from t - 15 to t + 20, t =
is the ca> cf the split anrcuncerent. The purpose of this analysis is
to determine the difference in movement for the two stock price series
-18-
during the period surrounding the split announcement. Those who expect
investors ^o react to ' he rnntuncenent of the split would hypothesize
a difference in the price movements for the split stcclcs during the period
immediately before and after tbe d.?.y of the announcement.
In addition to the mean cf the absolute prices, ve computed the
ratio of the price of the split stock divided by the price of the random
stock, and the ratio of the price cf the split stock divided by the stock
market index. The time series plot of this cross sectional average price
ratio indicates the relative price performance for the split stocks curing
the period surrounding the split announcement. Finally, ve computed the
ratio of the random stock divided by the market index and computed the
daily cress sectional average. Tie time series plot of this relative
price series thculd be a straight line which would indicate the appro-
priateness cf the random stock selection.
Analysis cf Volume
We also analyzed the tine series cf volume of trading for the cross
section cf split stocks, random stocks, and the aggregate market. Specifi-
cally, we examined the time series of mean average volume defined as follows:
130
MAV. = Z V. „/N
t i=l ijt
1IAV = mean average daily volume on day t.
V. = volume of trading for stock i en day t.
i, t
N = 130 split stocks, random stocks, cr the aggregate stock
market as represented by daily volume en the NYSE.
Again, in addition to the individual volume figures, we computed
the ratio of split stock volume to random stock volume, split stock
-19-
volume to aggregate market volume, and random stock volume to market
volume. The tine series plot of relative trading volume should high-
light any unique tracing effect surrounding the announcement of the
stock split.
Piscussion of Adjustment Technique
The analysis of the split stock price and volume relative to the
price and volume for a random stock and the aggregate market is intended
to control fcr the market. The authors are aware that this procedure
differs from the widely used technique employed by FFJP in their study
32
of stock splits.""* The FFJR technique examines the abnormal returns
from the security's characteristic line. Such an analysis requires the
computation of the stock's characteristic line baser1 upon numerous obser-
vations before and after the split and requires the assumption that the
parameters of the characteristic line are stable during the period of
analysis. Notablj , the study by Ear-Yosef and Brown discussed earlier
indicated that the beta for the split stocks is net generally stable
during this period and, therefore, it is necessary to derive a moving
beta."' Ir. the case of daily stock price observations it is likely
that the general instability of the parameters would be more pronounced
end, therefore, the use of such a technique would either require many
more observations or other adjustments for the instability. In addition,
a study ] y Kraus and Stoll dealing with daily stock price movements sur-
rounding block trades indicated that the use of the assumption cf an alpha
32
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, "Price Adjustments . ..." Op. C'.t.
""Ear-Yosef and Brown, "A Reexamination of Stock Splits ...," Cp. Cit.
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34
equal to zero and a beta of unity did not change their results. Also,
a study by Hopewell and Schwartz that also examined the daily stock price
adjustments surrounding temporary trading suspensions on the NYSE also
considered models with and without specific market adjustments and con-
tended that the results did not differ qualitatively and only slightly
35quantitatively.
Results for Daily Stock Prices
There are time series plots for the cross section of split stocks,
random stocks and the market series but they are not included due to
space constraints. Basically, the time series plot of random stocks
and the market series is a straight line, while the split stock plot
indicates a rising pattern prior to the announcement and a definite
decline after day t+4 . The time series plot of the stock price series
relative to the random stocks is contained in Figure 1. The plot in-
dicates a rising pattern almost from the beginning whereby the ratio
gees from about 1.90 to a high of 1.98 on day t+1, continues at that
level for three days and then begins a steady decline through day t+21
.
Notably, the major relative price changes occur from the close on day
t-2 to the close on day t-1 and from t-1 to day t.
The relative price change from the close on day t-2 to the close
on day t-1 is not so much an indication of an information leak or inside
information as it is evidence of very rapid adjustment to pre-publication
34
Alan Kraus and Hans R. Stoll, "Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New
York Stock Exchange," Journal of Finance , Vol. 27, No. 3 (June, 1973),
pp. 569-588.
35
"'Michael K. Hopewell and Arthur L. Schwartz, Jr., "Temporary Trading
Suspensions in Individual NYSE Securities," Journal of Finance , Vol. 33,
No. 5 (December, 1978), p. 1363.
020*2 000*2 ose'i 096'T 0Ti6*I 026*1 006*1
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information. Specifically, the announcement date was specified en the
basis of when the split was announced in the Wall Street Journal . The
fact is that in many instances the announcement of the split comes out
through the Bow-Jones News Service (i.e., the broad tape) during the day
prior to the day of the announcement in the paper. One can envision a
meeting of a firm's Board of Birectors at 10:00 a.m. and a subsequent
news release before noon regarding a proposed stock split. This news
release regarding the forthcoming stock split is then put out through
the news service during the afternoon and published in the Wall Street
Journal and other papers the following morning. Such a sequence of
events would mean that certain professional investors who have access
to the Bow-Jones news service or receive a call from a broker who sub-
scribes to the service could act the day before the completely public
announcement in the Wall Street Journal (i.e., they could act on day
t-1). These time series results indicate that apparently there are
investors who do react to this news service announcement. In addition
these results indicate that there is a further adjustment during the
day of the completely public announcement in the WTall Street Journal
and other papers. Finally, there appears to be a further adjustment on
day t+1, but it is much less than the prior adjustments. The relative
price pattern during the subsequent three days is constant followed by
price declines as noted.
As one might expect, the pattern of prices relative to the market
index contained in Figure 2 is very similar to the plot of Figure 1.
Again there is a generally rising pattern from t-14 to t-2, a sharp
rise from t-2 to t+1 and a declining pattern from t+2 to t+21.
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Results for Daily Trading Volume
The time series plot of daily trading volume for the split stocks
relative to the random stocks is contained in Figure 3. The plot in-
dicates a slight secular increase prior to the split announcement but
the series is rather volatile. In contrast, there is a very obvious
peak on day t=0, a small decline on day t+1 , followed by a sharp drop
on day t+2 and generally low volume on all subsequent days.
The time series plot for volume relative to aggregate market volume
is contained in Figure 4. The pattern is similar but again somewhat
smoother and somewhat more pronounced. Again there is some slight evi-
dence cf an increase prior to the announcement, a major spike on the
day of the public announcement, then a drop on day t+1 and generally
declining volume thereafter.
These volume results are especially interesting in terms of pin-
pointing the public impact of the announcement. Combined with the prior
discussion of the relative price pattern, these results would indicate
that prices began to experience relative increases several weeks before
the announcement on fairly normal volume, but experienced a significant
relative price change during day t-1 on relatively normal volume and
another large price increase during the day of the announcement with
very heavy volume. All subsequent price changes including the relative
price declines are on normal or declining volume. These combined results
indicate that the general public apparently does not react to the news until
it appears in the Wall Street Journal , but that there is some prior price
reaction from insiders or professionals on reasonable volume. This includes
the major price adjustment during day t-1 which apparently is caused by
professional investors reacting to the announcement on the news service.
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TESTS OF TRADING RULES
In addition to the analysis of absolute and relative price movements
surrounding the announcement of a stock split, the ultimate test of the
semi-strong efficient market hypothesis is an analysis of whether a trading
rule using the public announcement of a significant economic event would
be more profitable than a simple buy-and-hold policy. A number of trading
rules were considered with and without commissions. The tests without
commissions were intended to see if there were significant abnormal price
changes; the tests with commissions were intended to determine if one
could profit from any abnormal price changes in a real world environment.
Day of Announcement (Day 0)
The first set of tests analyze the investment results for an investor
who acquires the stock that is to be split at the close on the day of the
announcement in the Wall Street Journal . Given a purchase at the close on
Day 0, it is assumed that the stock is sold at the close on each Day 1
through 20. These results for the split stocks are taken alone, but also
compared to similar investment results for the cross section of random
stocks and for an investment in the market index.
Purchase Prior to Public Announcement
The second set of tests analyze the investment results for an investor
who acquires the stock that is to be split at the close on the day prior
to the announcement in the Wall Street Journal . Given a purchase at the
close on Day t-1, it is assumed that the stock is sold at the close on
Day through 20. Again these results are compared to similar invest-
ments in a random stock and the aggregate market.
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The results for this trading rule should indicate whether profes-
sionals who have access to the Dow Jones News Service could invest on
the basis of this semi-public information and generate abnormal returns.
Purchase on Day -2
This set of tests is for investors with inside information regarding
the forthcoming announcement. As such, it is really not a test of the
semi-strong efficient market, but would indicate whether anybody with
prior knowledge could experience abnormal returns from this announcement.
In this case, it is assumed the stock is acquired at the close two
days before the announcement and is sold at the close on day -1, through
day 19.
Short Sale on Announcement Day
In contrast to acquiring the stock on the day of the announcement,
one might speculate that there would be a unjustified increase in the
stock price as a result of the announcement, so it would be preferable
to sell the stock short at the close on Day or shortly thereafter and
cover the short sale on a subsequent day. Obviously, the returns from
this investment test would be the opposite of the results that tested
a purchase on Day 0.
Results from Purchase on Announcement Day
The results generated by a trading rule that assumes a purchase at
the closing price on day and a sale during subsequent days are contained
in Table 1 and a time series plot of the cumulative series is in Figure
5. The results for the unadjusted split stocks in the first column in-
dicate that there were positive price changes the first two days that
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TABLE 1
MEAN CUMULATIVE PERCENT PRICE CHANGES FOR SPLIT STOCKS
UNADJUSTED AND RELATIVE TO RANDOM STOCKS AND THE AGGREGATE
STOCK MARKET ASSUMING PURCHASE AT CLOSE ON DAY
OF THE SPLIT ANNOUNCEMENT
Mean Cumulative Percent Price Change
Split Stock Split Stock " Split Stock
Minus Minus
Random Stock Market Index
Close of
:
Day 1 0.487
2 0.682
3 0.605
4 0.283
5 0.000
6 -0.091
7 -0.316
8 -0.364
9 -0.439
10 -0.531
11 -0.653
12 -0.822
13 -0.605
14 -0.749
15 -0.851
16 -1.037
17 -0.843
18 -1.179
19 -1.255
20 -1.382
0.558
0.651
0.729
0.721
0.423
0.308
0.332
0.320
0.320
0.322
0.036
-0.277
-0.041
0.054
0.031
-0.080
0.307
-0.010
-0.256
-0.341
0.4 64
0.575
0.377
0.129
-0.161
-0.234
-0.389
-0.397
-0.535
-0.503
-0.535
-0.608
-0.424
-0.441
-0.508
-0.705
-0.513
-0.787
-0.735
-0.832
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cumulated to 0.682 percent. Subsequent price changes were negative such
that the cumulative percent change declined and became negative by the
close of day six and continued negative through day 20. The abnormal
price changes relative to the random stocks (the cumulative percent
price change for the split stock minus the cumulative percent price
change for the random stocks) was positive during the first three days
after the announcement as the cumulative abnormal price change increased
to a peak of 0.729 percent at the close on day three. There were sub-
sequent declines followed by small changes in both directions such that
the cumulative series varied between 0.30 and -0.30 percent. The final
column contains abnormal price changes relative to the aggregate market
(the cumulative percent price change for the split stock minus the cumu-
lative percent price change for the market index). This abnormal price
change series peaked at the end of the second day at 0.575 percent, de-
clined and became negative by the close of the fifth day after the
announcement and remained negative through day 20.
One can derive three major conclusions from these results. First,
the cumulative series tends to peak at the end of the second or third
day after the announcement which implies that the reaction is fast and
is completed rather quickly. The second conclusion is that the positive
cumulative abnormal price changes that last for several days indicate
that there is a definite positive impact from the announcement of a
stock split as contended by the folklore. The third conclusion, which
is important since it relates directly to the EMH, contends that an in-
vestor who acquired the stock of a company that announced a forthcoming
stock split at the close on the day of the announcement and sold it
-32-
during any of the following 20 days would not experience positive ab-
normal rates of return after considering a typical transaction cost of
2 percent (one percent to buy and one percent to sell) because the peak
cumulative percent change never exceeds 0.73 percent.
Results From Purchase on Day Minus One
The results generated by a trading rule that assumes a purchase at
the closing price on day minus one and a sale during subsequent days are
contained in Table 2 and a time series plot of the cumulative series is
in Figure 6. The cumulative percent change results are similar in pattern
to those in Table 1, but at a generally higher level than the results
assuming a purchase on the announcement day.
The unadjusted split stock series reached a peak of 1.425 percent
at the close of day two. Subsequently the series generally declined and
ended with negative cumulative returns. The split stock minus random
stock series peaked on day three at 1.628 percent and subsequently de-
clined but never became negative during the 20 days after the announce-
ment. Finally, when the split stock price was adjusted for the market
return the cumulative series peaked on day two at 1.355 percent and sub-
sequently declined to about zero on day 20.
The conclusions A^e from these results.very similar to those derived
when we assumed an acquisition on the day of the announcement. Specifi-
cally, the peak cumulative price change likewise occurs on either day
two or day three. This is to be expected since the only difference is
the base price—i.e., the assumed purchase price which is lower on day
minus one. Again, the important conclusion is that, although there de-
finitely were positive price changes after the semi-public announcement
-33-
TABLE 2
MEAN CUMULATIVE PERCENT PRICE CHANGES FOR SPLIT STOCKS
UNADJUSTED AND RELATIVE TO RANDOM STOCKS AND THE AGGREGATE
STOCK MARKET ASSUMING A PURCHASE AT CLOSE ON DAY PRIOR
TO THE SPLIT ANNOUNCEMENT
Close of:
Day 0.730
1 1.233
2 1.425
3 1.342
4 1.015
5 0.741
6 0.652
7 0.421
8 0.370
9 0.292
10 0.193
11 0.072
12 -0.093
13 0.121
14 -0.022
15 -0.124
16 -0.307
17 -0.116
18 -0.470
19 -0.545
20 -0.672
Mean Cumulative Percent Price Change
Split Stock ~ Split Stock Split Stock
Minus Minus
Random Stock Market Index
0.896 0.765
1.475 1.248
1.563 1.355
1.628 1.152
1.618 0.899
1.329 0.617
1.222 0.547
1.237 0.386
1.219 0.376
1.218 0.235
1.215 0.261
0.292 0.231
0.619 0.162
0.856 0.342
0.955 0.326
0.931 0.258
0.822 0.064
1.205 0.254
0.869 -0.036
0.634 0.018
0.545 -0.081
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on the broad tape, an investor who acquired the stock of a company who
announced a split at the closing price on the day before the public
announcement in the Wall Street Journal would not experience above
average price changes after taking account of normal transactions costs
of approximately 2 percent.
These results that reflect the probable investment experience for
professional investors who have access to the split announcement infor-
mation prior to its publication in the Wall Street Journal provide strong
support for the semi-strong efficient market hypotheses. These results
indicate that stock prices reflect the split announcement information
so rapidly that most professionals canno
t
derive abnormal rates of return.
Further, the majority of investors who cannot act until the following
day when the forthcoming split is announced in the Wall Street Journal
clearly do not experience positive abnormal returns but apparently lose
money due to transactions costs.
Results From Purchase on Day Minus Two
The results generated by a trading rule that assumes an investor ac-
quires the stock to be split at the close two days prior to the announce-
ment in the Wall Street Journal and sells on subsequent days are contained
in Table 3 and a time series plot of the cumulative percent change series
is in Figure 7. As noted before, these results are really not testing
the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis (EMH) since we assume the
purchase is made prior to any form of public announcement. This analysis
could be considered a test of the strong form EMH because one could
assume that some insiders might be aware of the forthcoming announcement.
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TABLE 3
MEAN CUMULATIVE PERCENT PRICE CHANGES FOR SPLIT STOCKS
UNADJUSTED AND RELATIVE TO RANDOM STOCKS AND THE AGGREGATE
STOCK MARKET ASSUMING A PURCHASE AT THE CLOSE TWO DAYS
PRIOR TO THE SPLIT ANNOUNCEMENT
Close of:
Day -1 1.089
1.832
1 2.346
2 2.552
3 2.468
4 2.134
5 1.863
6 1.781
7 1.543
3 1.492
9 1.414
10 1.315
11 1.188
12 1.022
13 1.247
14 1.109
15 0.997
16 0.810
17 1.004
18 C.642
19 0.557
Mean Cumulative Percent Price Changes
Split Stock Split Stock Split Stock
Minus Minus
Random Stock Market Index
0.986 1.059
1.896 1.837
2.491 2.328
2.597 2.448
2.660 2.243
2.640 1.981
2.357 1.704
2.270 1.642
2.275 1.472
2.258 1.461
2.257 1.320
2.256 1.345
1.968 1.310
1.655 1.240
1.908 1.432
1.997 1.420
1.969 1.342
1.863 1.145
2.248 1.338
1.903 1.040
1.659 1.085
X
CJ
^3
c
•H
4-1
CD
.Si
CD S-l
Si cfl
CO B
Xi
o f.
u 3
3 3
P-i
6
co
4J J<!
oo 3 CJ
c CD
H = i^
6 z en
3 a
en 3 4-1
en 3 rt
< o —
i
H
en 3 en
0) < I
oo 2
c O
en •H • #>
j= — X,
CJ J3 U
3
en a. _i
o en
•H tu
S-i _z p
I~- b 4-1 o
-3
0) 4-1 01 £
1- c u CO
3 a> o u
oo o 14-4H i-i <u en
fi. CJ 03 3
Q* C
en •H
aj >.
~
> CO
•ri a ^:
4-1 o
CO c c
i—l 3 4J
3 r- X
c=
3 cu 4J
CJ en •H
O r—
Lij r-4 q«
c o en
4-1 CJ 22
—1 4-1 n
e- ^
4-1 ej
en CO O
0) 4-1
•H en
u
CJ 4-1
e/3 •H
UJ CX
S en
—4
H —
CJ
en
3
•i-i
-a
CO
3
3
1
in
o
4-
I
s
-
OJ
o
CD
--1/J
o"-1
.CO
~Xo
_i
_jD
U_O
oiCO
cx
o
o
o
CO
0*2 0'T 0*0 0*1- 0*3-
33NbH3 33iyd lN33y3d 3AIlUinNl13
ere-
-38-
Again, as expected, the pattern of cumulative price changes is the
same whereby all the series either peak at the close of day two or day
three. The major difference is the size of the cumulative price changes.
In the case of the unadjusted series, the peak is 2.55 percent on day
two. The series adjusted for random stocks had a peak on day three of
2.66 percent, while the market adjusted series peaked at 2.45 percent
on day two.
These results indicate that it is_ possible to derive abnormal price
changes after normal transactions costs if one can acquire the stock at
the close on the day prior to any public announcement of the split. This
is conceivably only available to corporate insiders which would indicate
evidence against the strong form EMH. Notably, because it is necessary
to sell the stock within three days after the announcement, the trading
activity would be rather obvious to anybody investigating the event.
Results From Selling Short
As noted, because the pattern of cumulative price changes peaks
shortly after the announcement and declines thereafter, one might con-
jecture that it is possible to derive abnormal profits from selling the
stock short and subsequently covering the sale. The results in Table 1
can be used to determine what would happen under these conditions since
a short sale would imply a reversal of all signs.
Assuming a short sale at the close on the day of the announcement,
the results would be exactly as shown with the signs reversed. In this
case, one can see that the cumulative percent price changes peak on the
last day at 1.38 percent for the unadjusted price series, 0.34 percent
for the random stock adjusted series, and 0.83 percent for the market
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adjusted series. Again, none of these cumulative percent price changes
would imply superior abnormal returns after normal transactions costs
of 2 percent.
Alternatively, one might assume that investors recognize that the
prices on these stocks do not peak until the close two or three days
after the announcement. To examine the results under this assumption
one should consider the difference in the cumulative percent price
changes from day two or three and day 20. In the case of the unadjusted
prices this implies a difference of 2.064 percent (0.682 plus 1.382)
which is just above the 2 percent breakeven point after commissions. An
analysis of the more relevant adjusted series indicates that the differ-
ence for the random stock adjusted series is 1.070 percent (0.729 plus
0.341) and the implied abnormal return for the market adjusted series
is 1.407 percent (0.575 plus 0.832). The implied returns from the two
adjusted series are below the normal transactions costs and would imply
that it is not possible to derive abnormal returns from selling the
stock short even at its peak price following the split announcement.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
A number of prior studies have examined the price movements sur-
rounding stock splits in order to determine the profit opportunities.
Most of these prior studies either used monthly data or employed the
split date as the base period. This study examined in detail the short-
run profit opportunities surrounding stock splits by examining daily
stock price changes surrounding the public announcement of the stock
split which should be the relevant day in terms of testing the efficient
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market hypothesis. We also examined the trading volume during this
period which has not been considered in prior studies.
The analysis of the price series for the split stocks relative to
a sample of random stocks and an aggregate stock market index indicated
that the price series displayed generally positive abnormal price changes
beginning several weeks before the announcement with a major price change
occuring between the close on day minus two and the close on day minus
one. There was another large price change from the close on day minus
one to the close on the day of the announcement. Notably, the large
relative price change on day minus one is not attributable to inside
information, but is probably caused by the actions of professionals who
have access to the Dow Jones News Service. There are further small in-
creases the two days after the announcement followed by generally de-
clining stock prices.
The relative volume figures indicated a small secular increase in
volume prior to the announcement, but a major "spike" in relative volume
on the day of the announcement. Subsequently, there was a sharp drop in
volume and generally declining figures for the subsequent 20 days. These
results indicate that the principle information impact comes from the
announcement in the Wall Street Journal .
The final section examined the specific profit opportunities avail-
able from acquiring the stocks involved on alternative days. Specifically,
we assumed acquisitions of the stock on the day of the announcement in
the Wall Street Journal when the information would be completely public;
on the day prior to the completely public announcement when the infor-
mation would be available to most professionals; and two days prior to
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the public announcement when the information might be available to in-
siders. All cumulative price series peaked on either day two or three
after the announcement which would indicate a positive response to the
information, but rather rapid price adjustment to the announcement. Cn
the important question of abnormal profit opportunities, the results in-
dicated that there were clearly no excess returns available to investors
who acquired the stock on the day of the announcement and who paid normal
transactions costs. Further, although the abnormal returns were higher
for investors who were able to acquire the stock at the close on the
day before the announcement in the Wall Street Journal , the returns were
likewise not enough to derive excess returns after taking account of
normal transactions costs. Finally, the results for investors able to
acquire the stock two days prior to the public announcement indicated
that these investors with apparent inside information regarding the
forthcoming announcement could experience abnormal returns even after
paying normal transactions costs. Because of the obvious decline in
relative price after the announcement we also considered short selling
opportunities. Short selling on the day of the announcement was defin-
itely not profitable and neither was selling short when the stock peaked
two or three days after the announcement if one assumed normal trans-
actions costs.
Conclusion
In general the results consistently supported the semi-strong effi-
cient market hypothesis because they indicated that stock prices either
adjusted prior to or very shortly after the public announcement of stock
splits. Regarding the very important question regarding abnormal profit
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opportunities, the results indicated they were not available to the
general public or to professionals who had to pay normal transactions
costs. The results do not support the strong form EMH because it appears
that abnormal profits are available to investors with inside information
about the forthcoming split announcement.
A small caveat appears to be in order at this point. Throughout
the discussion of profit opportunities we referred to normal transactions
costs of 2 percent. Clearly the results would be different for investors
who were not required to pay the normal commission such as floor traders
on the Exchange. Also, with the requirement of fully negotiated commi-
sions on May 1, 1975 ("May Day"), it is readily acknowledged that the
normal discount for institutions has been approximately 40 percent from
the fixed commission schedule in effect on May 1, 1975. Also individuals
who trade actively in large amounts can likewise derive disccunts from
proclaimed "discount brokers." Therefore, one may feel that the standard
2 percent is above the current "normal" transaction cost and would contend
that the results would differ somewhat under these conditions. While
this difference is certainly possible, it is felt that most of the results
would hold except for those investors with substantially lower costs be-
cause the returns were typically less than 1.5 percent.
Finally, one might feel that we should have used prices other than
the closing prices since investors could acquire the stock at other prices
during the day. Assuming that prices were generally increasing almost
constantly during these periods one might want to imagine some price that
is an average of the closing prices. The effect of this assumption on
the results would be returns about midway between those reported for
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alternative days. It seems clear that even this price adjustment would
not be enough to make the investment profitable for investors who bought
the stock on the day of the announcement—i.e., it would only increase
their return to about 1.20 percent. In contrast such an assumption
would provide a cumulative return close to 2 percent for those who could
buy during the day prior to the announcement day. Therefore, if one
conceived of a purchase prior to the close at a price below the closing
price and a lower than normal transaction cost, this could result in
superior abnormal returns. Clearly this set of conditions should only
be applicable to a limited number of individuals.
Implications
These results consistently confirm the semi-strong EMH based upon
price movements and profit opportunities under almost all possible condi-
tions. This implies that the search for abnormal profits by investing in
stocks that announce forthcoming splits is best described as a useless ex-
ercise except for the few professionals that receive the news early from
the broad tape and can buy and sell the stock at below normal transactions
costs.
-44-
REFERENCES
Barker, C. Austin, "Effective Stock Splits," Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January-February, 1956), pp. 101-106.
Barker, C. Austin, "Stock Splits in a Bull Market," Harvard
Business Reviev , Vol. 35, No. 3 (May-June, 1957), pp. 72-79.
Barker, C. Austin, "Evaluation of Stock Dividends," Harvard
Business Review
,
Vol. 36, No. 4 (July-August, 1958), pp. 99-113.
Bar-Yosef , Sasscn and Brown, Lawrence D., "A Reexamination of
Stock Splits Using Moving Betas," Journal of Finance , Vol. 32,
No. 4 (September, 1977), pp. 1069-1080.
Bar-Yosef, Sasson and Brown, Lawrence D., "Share Price Levels
and Beta," Financial Management
,
Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring, 1979),
pp . 60-63
.
Bellemore, Douglas and Blucher, Lillian, "A Study of Stock Splits
in the Post War Years," Financial Analysts Journal
,
Vol. 12, No.
6 (November, 1956), pp. 19-26.
Eurnell, 0. K. , "Price Effects of Stock Dividends and Split-Ups,"
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (December 2, 1948), p. 10.
Copeland, Thomas E., "Liquidity Changes Following Stock Splits,"
Journal of Finance , Vol. 34, No. 1 (March, 1979), pp. 115-141.
Dolley, J. C, "Characteristics and Procedures of Common Stock
Split-Ups," Harvard Business Review
,
Vol. 11, No. 3 (April, 1933),
pp. 316-326.
Fama, Eugene, Fisher, Lawrence, Jensen, Michael, and Roll, Richard,
"The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information," International
Economics Review
,
Vol. 10, No. 1 (February, 1969), pp. 1-22.
Hausman, W. H. , West, R. R., and Largay, J. A., "Stock Splits,
Price Changes, and Trading Profits: A Synthesis," Journal of
Business, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January, 1971). pp. 69-77.
Hopewell, Michael and Schwartz, Arthur L., Jr., "Temporary Trading
Suspensions in Individual NYSE Securities," Journal of Finance
,
Vol. 33, No. 5 (December, 1978), pp. 1355-1373.
Johnson, Keith B., "Stock Splits and Price Change," Journal of
Finance , Vol. 21, No. 5 (December, 1966), pp. 675-686.
Kimball, Peter and Papera, Robert, "Effect of Stock Splits on
Short-Term Market Prices," Financial Analysts Journal , Vol. 20,
No. 3 (May-June, 1964), pp. 75-80.
-45-
Kraus, Alan and Stoll, Hans R., "Price Impacts of Block Trading
on the New York Stock Exchange," Journal of Finance , Vol. 27, No.
3 (June, 1973), pp. 569-588.
Merjcs, Anna, "Sell on the News—When Stocks Split Take the Money
and Run," Barrons (May 31, 1976), pp. 11, 16, 17.
Millar, James A. and Fielitz, Bruce D., "Stock-Split and Stock-
Dividend Dimensions," Financial Management , Vol. 2, No. 4 (Winter,
1973), pp. 35-45.
Myers, J. H. and Eakay, A. J., "Influence of Stock Split-Ups on
Market Price," Harvard Business Review , Vol. 26, No. 2 (March,
1948), pp. 251-255.
M/D/112-1


t\V

